Aid for Trade Initiative: Through the African Lens

CHAPTER 1

                               1.1 Introduction

The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in 2005 led to the creation of a new WTO work programme on Aid for Trade Initiative (AfT). It mandated the creation of a WTO Task Force to provide recommendations on (1) how to operationalize AfT, and (2) how AfT might contribute most effectively to the development dimension of the Doha Development Agenda (Hynes & Holden., 2016 p.594). The Task Force was comprised of the familiar players of developed countries (including the EU), developing countries, developing country institutions and the least-developed country (LDC) group. The WTO had recognised that the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, regional development banks, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other relevant international agencies was essential to any success and implementation of the project (WTO, 2006a., cited in Hynes & Holden 2016 p.595).  Some developing country groupings were supportive of a new, dedicated AfT fund or facility to be based at the African Development Bank (AfDB) (AfDB., 2006 cited in Ibid). However, the donors in the WTO Task Force were very much against creating a new fund or institution and so a new trade development was born.

The AfT Initiative was launched in 2006 under the auspice of the WTO to not only help developing countries, and in particularly LDCs to trade but also to develop synergies between trade policy and development aid. The WTO identified that developing countries faced a range of supply-side and trade-related infrastructure obstacles which constrained engagement with international trade. Therefore the WTO-led AfT Initiative encouraged developing country governments and donors to recognize the role that trade could play in stimulating economic growth. The initiative sought to mobilize resources to address the trade-related constraints identified by developing and LDCs (WTO AfT)[1].

The role of global AfT can be reviewed from a governance and/or a development perspective depending on the aim and context of inquiry. In this instance one can explore it from three angles to best reflect and understand ‘what’s in it’ for the donors and recipients of this initiative. First, relating to trade policy and whether multilateral and regional trade agreements are really necessary to enhance market access to promote growth and development (Hynes and Holden.,2016 p.593). Second; that foreign aid effectiveness and economic growth are intertwined (Easterly., 2003 p.23). And, third; the growing recognition of AfT as a ‘win-win’ for all, contrary to the widely held view that the donors use aid as a means to foster their own commercial interests (Hühne et al., 2013 p.4). These arguments will form the basis of the literature review from a recipient regional perspective.

The African continent,  in particular Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a key destination of significant AfT capital. Indeed,  under the auspice of the African Union (AU) the region has a commitment towards an ambitious plan to create the world’s largest trade area since the creation of the WTO. The objective of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is to develop a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of business people and investments. A key aspect to the agreement is that the African regional economic communities (RECs) Free Trade Areas will act as building bloc[k]s for the AfCFTA[2].

The principal contribution of this paper is therefore to link the different aspects of the literature on the AfT Initiative with the role and approach of key donors (traditional and non-traditional) to hypothesize that the AfT Initiative still needs to do more to better align with the policy, priorities and integration agenda of continental Africa.

The paper will therefore proceed as follows: section one will focus on the traditional theory of aid and economic growth, followed by an assessment on who actually benefits from this growth. Section two will consider the international governance approach to AfT. Section three will conclude with an assessment of the African perspective and its expectations for the AfT Initiative and what needs to be done for them to be met.

1.2 Theory on Aid for Growth

The debate on foreign aid effectiveness and economic research emanates from the academic studies of Burnside and Dollar (2000) which set out to investigate the relationship between foreign aid, economic policy and growth of per capita GDP as developed by the World Bank. William Easterly (2003) found fundamental inconsistencies in the methodological approach adopted by Burnside and Dollar, these discrepancies were between the variables employed, the period of time sampled and regional factors that were highlighted in the study to wrongly arrive at the conclusion that aid only had a positive impact on growth in only developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but with little effect (developing countries) in the presence of poor policies (Easterly., 2003, p.24).

Easterly (2013) illustrated that the Burnside and Dollar analysis formed the basis of a new policy recommendation to increase foreign aid, only in situations where other policies were good. However without factoring the expansion of the dataset or using alternative definitions of “aid”, “policies” and “growth” (Easterly.,2003.p.26). In drawing empirical evidence on the links from aid to economic growth to support this premise, Easterly 2003 drew earlier comparison to show that inconclusive literature was mainly hampered by the limited data available to consider the mechanisms by which aid would actually affect growth. As an illustration he cites Boone (1996) who found that aid financed consumption rather than investment,[3] this prompted Hansen and Tarp (2000) to suggest that if greater aid is given in response to slower growth, then interpreting how aid flows affect growth could be difficult. This led Easterly (2003) to introduce political determinants of aid as instruments to address problems of reverse causality (Easterly., 2003. p.26).

The traditional theoretical model on the notion that aid can influence growth for many years had been the “two-gap” model by Chenery and Strout (1996., cited in Easterly., 2003. p.30) which identified the first gap to be between the amount of investment necessary to attain a certain rate of growth and the available domestic saving. Whereas the second gap was between import requirements for a given level of production and for foreign exchange earnings. Easterly (2003) focused on the investment – saving gap for mainly policy analysis reasons. In this model, the premise is that economic growth depends on investment as a share of GDP when adjusted by a factor that reveals whether investment is of high or poor quality and whether that amount of investment will be the sum of domestic savings and foreign aid (Ibid., p.31). 

Easterly (2003) reasoned that the model for which aid fills the “financing gap” makes two key assumptions: first it assumes a stable linear relationship between investment and growth over the short to medium run. Whereas the neoclassical model encouraged an exogenous increase in investment to raise growth temporarily during the transition from one steady state to another. In this sense there is no permanent causal relationship between investment and growth. The main alternative to neoclassical growth models focus on endogenous growth models, which stress a multitude of inputs besides physical capital, such as technology, human capital, intermediate new goods, organizational capital, social capital and institutional design (Ibid).

A second key assumption of the model in which aid fills a “financing gap” and allows greater investment, proposes that aid will actually finance investment rather than consumption. But the assumption will hold true only if investment is liquidity-constrained and incentives to invest were favorable. If the cause of low investment is that the incentives to invest are poor, then aid will not increase investment (Easterly., 2003. p.30). Therefore aid could actually worsen incentives to invest if the recipient believes that future poverty will call forth future aid (the classic “Samaritan’s dilemma). In either case aid would finance consumption rather than investment which Boone (1996) in sections of the sample and Burnside and Dollar (2000) that aid only affected growth in the presence of good public policies but not necessarily raising investment (Easterly 2003., p.32). In earlier works (Easterly (2001)) Easterly showed that the “financing gap” argument of aid improving investment and then that investment increases economic growth was deemed to provide dubious theoretical foundations and numerous empirical failings. Despite this, no other model of aid and growth has arisen to take its place as it continues to be used in the World Bank and other institutions making aid policy (Ibid., p.33) and continues to plague aid bureaucracies, aid disbursements and ultimately shaping the balance of donor – recipient gains and losses.

1.3 Who benefits from AfT growth

The AfT Initiative is designed to remove frictional barriers to trade such as in transportation, communication and energy infrastructure thus creating an enabling environment for multilateral trade to make progress. The ongoing debate over who benefits from AfT is well presented by Hühne et al (2013)[4], investigating whether exporters in the donor countries were among the main beneficiaries. Hühne et al (Ibid.) focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid in strengthening the export capacity of recipient countries and hypothesized that AfT is as much in the self-interest of donor countries as it is in promoting the exports of recipient countries when comparing the effects of AfT on trade in both directions.

The findings were interesting in that AfT increased recipient exports to donors as well as recipient imports from donors, hence the former effect dominating the latter (Ibid.). However this, contradicted the overwhelming skeptical view being held: that donors provide aid to developing countries to facilitate their exports to aid-recipient countries (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2009 cited in Liu and Tang. 2018 p.49). The Hühne et al research found that AfT best promotes the exports of middle-income countries rather than, for instance, SSA countries (with few exceptions). The fundamental assumptions from this analysis being that, improved infrastructure provided an important stimulus to recipient exports as well as donor exports further unavailing the ‘selfish donor motives’ principle, that key donors only target AfT strategically by selecting infrastructure projects that serve primarily their own export interests (Hühne et al.,July 2013).

These findings on selected regions point to the fact that, whilst AfT may be best needed most in SSA countries to strengthen the recipient countries’ integration into world markets, the reality is that AfT is more effective in promoting the exports of east Asia and Latin America than the exports of SSA countries. At the same time, it is mainly SSA countries that AfT has been positively been associated with higher imports from the donor countries (East Asia, Latin America benefit more than Africa). In addition a large proportion of gross overseas development assistance (ODA) goes to non – LDC’s as middle-income countries are more attractive partners for infrastructural and productive capacity assistance (OECD/WTO, 2013 cited in Hynes and Holden., 2016, p.599). 

The question on whether the effectiveness of AfT varies between the different types of donor countries was addressed by Berthélemy (2006., cited in Hühne et al July 2013) where a rating of donors were classified as ‘altruistic’, ‘moderate’, or ‘egoistic’. The effect of AfT granted by altruistic donors on recipient exports proved to be more significant and quantitatively important[5]. The findings suggested that a doubling of total AfT by altruistic donors implied an increase in recipient exports by a significant percentage. The quantitative effect on recipient exports were determined to be stronger for the group of altruistic donors, compared to the group of egoistic donors. However, no evidence were found to suggest that donors classified as egoistic only used AfT to promote their own export interests (Ibid.) and as we will see below the different donors approach reflect a strategy that complements foreign policy interests.

The European Union is a key multilateral donor and the EU AfT is characterised by a much higher disbursement rate than that of other donors (80% for the EU compared to 65% for the average DAC donor). Three main donors are responsible for about 75%  of European AfT: Germany, France and the EU). In 2015, trade-related infrastructure and building productive capacity constituted 97% of European AfT; African countries remain the main beneficiaries of EU AfT, with 36% in 2015, followed by Asia (26%), Europe (15%) and America (10%). In its 2015 ‘trade for all’ strategy, the European Commission made it clear that EU trade policy should not only benefit its citizens. Developing countries were to be encouraged to integrate into global chains by the EU opening its markets for developing – country exports through preferential trade regimes; specifically tailored free trade and development agreements, such as economic partnership agreements (EPAs)[6]; and the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences Regulation based on the WTO’s enabling clause[7].  The EU to promote sustainable development is therefore providing three preferential access schemes to developing countries based on (a) The Generalised System of Preference (GSP)[8], (b) GSP+[9] and (c) The Everything but Arms (EBA)[10].

British trade policy has largely been run by the EU for the last four decades however the UK social policy has always remained a national matter. Since the British people voted to leave the EU (Brexit) it now provides the chance for Britain to bring the two back together (Baldwin et al 2017.,p.14). Indeed the developing countries will be concerned on the UK’s post – Brexit Britain trade and development policy apparoch. It is argued that the UK is likely to rely on existing best practices that embraces the Global Value Chain (GVC) ‘revolution’ to update trade and development policy to best match with the demands of 21^st century realities, that is WTO-led hence to enable developing countries to participate in and benefit from GVCs (Ibid.,p.12).

As the EU’s EPAs policies have met with a great deal of criticism, it is suggested that one that does seem to work well is the EPA with the Caribbean Forum (Keane 2016., cited in Baldwin et al 2017.,p.9). This could be a model for the UK’s own bilateral agreements with the developing nations, especially when it comes to beyond-tariffs issues (Ibid.,p.14). It covers services, investment and e-commerce, providing more than the EU’s existing commitments in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); thus offering tariff preferences for services rather than of goods (Ibid.,p.9) and strategically placing Britain’s participation and leadership in GVC in trade and development policy.

As Britain moves away from the EU’s approach the US pro-development policy under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides a template for a relationship with African nations. It currently does not demand lower tariffs to American goods in the way that the EU’s current policy does. And it applies to EBA as well as to middle-income economies with the prospect to foster regional cooperation and intra-African trade (Ibid.,p.8).

The UK continues to maintain its active role in designing AfT programmes: one such example is the creation in East Africa (TradeMark East Africa)[11] of UK aid-financed one-stop border posts dedicated to harmonising customs checks at borders and which has reduced the time to transport cargo from the port of Mombasa in Kenya to Kampala, Uganda (Ibid.,p.54). The UK also provides assistance to developing countries to negotiate trade agreements through its Trade Advocacy Fund, therefore AfT on a new UK trade policy will not just reduce tariffs but also could use AfT as a complement to stimulate two-way trade and investment to help developing countries implement new agreements (Keane 2016 cited in Mendez-Parra et al. 2016.,p.54).

The American and Chinese approach to AfT especially in Africa is worth mentioning as both arguably share different objectives. That is the US foreign aid is not used as a catalyst for trade interests but rather strategic and security interests. Whereas China provides unconditional aid to Africa (guided by the foreign policy principle of non-interference), and in return, African countries import more Chinese products and export their abundant natural resources to China. In the case of the US, aid plays a significant role in not only improving its global economic environment but also promotes its exports and in turn US global power (Amusa et al., 2016 cited in Liu and Tang., 2018. p.49). The aid is primarily conducted by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with non-governmental organizations (NGO) acting as the primary partners. An example would be the trade facilitation program employed by the USAID East Africa Trade and Investment Hub[12] to help increase trade and attract investment through the private sector under the AGOA[13].

However, China with an ever-increasing presence in Africa has more than 70% of its aid in the region spent on big infrastructure construction projects. Over 30% of the total value of projects in Africa is supported by Chinese aid, which by far outweighs the Western donors (Liu and Tang., 2018. p.48). Liu and Tang empirical results suggest that the US aid and China’s aid have a significant positive impact on their exports to Africa, while there is a lack of evidence for the positive impact of US aid on total bilateral trade and its imports from Africa. Importantly the research findings showed that China could maintain the existing foreign aid policy as a catalyst for its exports within the South-South cooperation framework, which brings win-win collaboration for China and Africa (Ibid. p.63).

As part of its Africa economic diplomacy, China recently pledged new infrastructure investments of USD60bn (£46BN) at the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)  summit held in Beijing[14]. These developments keep the US at the peripheries (politically and economically) in Africa.  The recently launched US ‘New Africa Strategy’[15] is therefore designed to respond to China and Russia, which the Trump administration consider as expanding financial and political influence across Africa to gain a competitive advantage over the US. These geopolitical developments have fundamental implications in the global efforts to synchronize and agree on how AfT is best delivered in a transparent and sustainable manner.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 International aid governance

In understanding the broader challenges of ‘global governance’ one must make reference to international development cooperation in its justification call for a central authority to manage the ‘financial flow system’ within a defined set of international arrangements (institutions, laws and norms) in specific sectors (Hansenclever et al, 1997 cited in Hynes and Holden, 2016. p.597). Unfortunately, the current international development ‘regime’ is densely packed with institutions of different types, including: state donors, regional/international /multilateral organisations and NGOs of different types (Ibid.,598). The UN’s universal membership therefore provides a unique legitimacy to play a leading role in promoting co-operation at all levels. Specific agencies such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) have made substantial contributions to the effort to track and monitor AfT flows.

The development assistance committee (DAC) has played a leading role in setting standards for developed state donors and has set the statistical norm for classifying and measuring aid flows. Importantly it also serves as a forum for the exchange of ideas on best practice, and its role in evaluation has remained important in encouraging mutual learning[16], however more needs to be done to integrate an association of member countries and/or regions as recipients to the AfT capital to balance the debate and be part of the decision making process.

A major challenge therefore remains the increased aid being provided by ‘non-traditional donors’ from the emerging world such as China which continues to pressure the (DAC-led) Working Party on High Level Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 (at the 2^nd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness) was focused to harmonise aid management procedures and adhere to standards of transparency and ownership. The Busan conference of 2011 (the 4^th Forum) attempted to extend these ‘Western’ / DAC development aid norms to emerging donors. Although emerging donors signed up to Busan on the principle of shared goals, China’s acceptance of the principles, commitments, and actions as the reference for South-South cooperation, albeit on a voluntary basis was welcomed (Hayashikawa, 2015., p.1).

CHAPTER 3

3.1 The global reviews   

The focus for the next Global Review of Aid for Trade 2019 at the WTO will be under the theme “Supporting Economic Diversification and Empowerment for Inclusive, Sustainable Development through Aid for Trade”[17]. The Global Reviews are a major institutional forum of the AfT initiative offering the opportunity for a wide range of actors (including high-level decision-makers) to come together. In addition they provide a focal point for analytical and research work and as such provide the means of facilitating dialogue and diffusing best practice. However the success of the reviews have always been contigent on the participation of the donors and developing countries to hold frank and honest discussions (Hynes and Holden. 2016., p.602).

Analysis of the ‘Fifth Global Aid for Trade Review’[18] provides a good illustration of how sometimes the sessions do not meet expectations. Bruce Byiers (2015) reflecting on the outcome of the fifth ‘Global Review’ themed: facilitating trade to lower the costs to trade agreed that although the discussions were important there were always little controversy about the role that costs play in inhibiting trade. He suggested that the review missed three fundamental focus areas in the debate, on industrial policy; thinking and working politically; and private sector engagements to better address the broader ‘beyond aid’ rhetoric and most importantly for the lack of interest in linking aid with private sector dynamics and investment to better  boost the opportunities created by trade[19].      

The forthcoming Global Review 2019 themed on “supporting economic diversification” raises questions on whether structural change in Africa is a prerequisite to economic diversification. The question of whether AfT helped African economies to achieve structural transformation remains to be proved. Structural change entails the reallocation of employment from low productivity “traditional” sectors, such as agriculture, to high productivity “modern” sectors, such as manufacturing and tradable services, these reallocation increases average labour productivity and hence average incomes[20]. According to Page (2018)[21] Africa’s economic structure has changed very little and currently at a slow pace. This has been a cause of worry for policymakers and analysts including the AU, the AfDB, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (Page.,2018.p.66).

These policymakers see a new pattern of structural change emerging in Africa that is different from the manufacturing-led transformation of East Asia which encouraged economic diversification. However, across Africa ICT-based services, tourism, and transport are outpacing the growth of manufacturing in many countries. From this premise to promote economic diversification in Africa the next Global Review 2019 should focus discussions centered on the case for developing a strategy for economic diversification before structural transformation. This argument is  based on three factors that have largely shaped the global distribution of manufacturing that is; First, the “investment climate” (the environment within which firms operate); second, the capacity to export, and the third is agglomeration. The three are inter-related, and to boost the pace of structural change, African governments need to address them concurrently as infrastructure, skills, and competition which are key elements of the investment climate. Governments can also support and prioritise agglomerations by concentrating investments in high-quality institutions and infrastructure in special economic zone (SEZ)[22] (for example the Hawassa Industrial Park in Ethiopia) which if successful could develop the process of diversification for onward exports both at intra-African level and for international markets.

3.2 Africa’s strategic priorities

AfT is explicitly addressed in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Goal 8[23]  therefore for AfT to deliver on the ambitions of this goal in Africa, donor partners must align with the objectives contained in the AU’s long-term development vision and action plan under the aegis of the AU Agenda 2063 and ensure that they are well – targeted and aligned with the continent’s strategic priority of structural transformation. David Luke et al (2017) recommended three key strategic priorities: (1) refocusing AfT for enhanced intra-African trade, (2) making AfT work all, and (3) strengthening human and institutional capacities for effective AfT.  Luke et al (2017) argue that trade can be more effectively used as a tool to transform African economies and achieve the 2030 Agenda in Africa (Luke et al 2017., p.1).

Evidence, points to the coming into force of the AfCFTA and the Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) Action Plan[24] that are aimed at harnessing the transformative potential of intra-African trade to be more diversified and industrialized than Africa’s trade with the rest of the world (Ibid.,p.3). The article argues that the AfT needs to enhance and align to increase the share of regional or multi-country projects and focus on diversification of AfT funding beyond trade policy support. It is suggested that the BIAT Action Plan could act as a useful framework for ensuring that the projects implemented through AfT in these key areas[25] could work towards boosting intra-African trade (Ibid.,p.4).

In many LDCs in Africa, China is now the major source of aid, trade and investment however as defined by the OECD the various instruments stated as part of the Chinese foreign assistance programme do not qualify for reporting as ODA (Hayashikawa 2015., p.1). In order to make AfT work for all, special attention and increased AfT support is required for LDC’s. The vast majority of funding via AfT in Africa goes to non LDCs therefore a deliberate targeting of AfT to LDCs is crucial and could continue to be channeled through the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for Trade-related Technical Assistance to LDCs[26]. Almost three quarters of EIF funds directed towards Africa could be better targeted on transformative regional projects, including through support to corridor management institutes, RECs, and the African Union Commission’s (AUC) programmes such as BIAT Action Plan. Luke et al 2007 emphasise that the key problem is that EIF has a country focus mirroring the AfT and as a consequence increasing the share of regional projects should be a priority for both (Luke et al 2017., p.4).

A focus on strong institutional structures could ensure the effective design, implementation, and monitoring of AfT projects. The rational for this approach is that most AfT activities cut across several policy areas and sectors. It is therefore crucial that national institutions are supported to build required capacities to exercise ownership as weak coordination, governance structures, and technical capacities can undermine the efficiency and effective utilisation of AfT (Ibid.,p.5).

The case of Kenya and Ethiopia’s new SGR railways allude to this point as the required deeper technology transfer needed is hindered by the commercial incentives at play: Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) may support knowledge transfer and skills training in some aspects of rail projects, but like other profit-seeking bodies – they have little to gain from handing over the underlying technology to local firms or industries in Africa (Chen 2008.,p.3)[27].

Evidence of greater use of technology to facilitate trade in Africa is emerging with one of the continent’s free trade areas – the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) – which has recently enlisted UNCTAD to help make it easier and faster to move goods in the region[28]. These constraints and efforts in the key areas of support (economic infrastructure and projects aimed at building productive capacity) are crucial to contributing to Africa’s structural transformation.

CHAPTER 4

4.1 Conclusion

Donor aid from developed countries facilitates trade and investments outcomes when employed in key strategic sectors across Africa. The African continent has received and experienced tremendous financial and political attention from traditional and non-traditional AfT donors focused on economic growth. A reflection on the AfT approach from the key donors (China, EU, UK, US) paints a picture of an economic project employing different approaches under the umbrella of global governance however not taking into account the regional priorities which could have unintended consequences for shared prosperity.

Africa with her strategic priorities under the aegis of the AU Agenda 2063 could employ a powerful strategy and approach to utilise the AfT Initiative as a theory of change for economic restructuring, social policies and administrative reforms to manage the diplomacy and politics of the AfT narrative. These opportunities will help to create an enabling environment for the AfCFTA to flex the intra-Africa trade ‘muscles’ able to reshape an economic environment that best safeguards regional trade and foreign policy interests.

This will call for an African led AfT strategy that profusely leans towards an African economic diplomacy strategy with the overriding objective of building the potential of RECs to trade and integrate into local and eventually GVC for economic development. Such a strategy can be an important coruscate of how governments, trade partners and high-level decision makers could work in tangent with all the donor partners to encourage diversity and technology transfer.

The role of economic diplomacy becomes apparent as the global economic realities  emerge of more trade and investment gearing towards an ever greater dependence on emerging markets (with fast growth) that are moving up the value chain. In this scenario the AU and its recognised RECs must employ an offensive economic diplomacy strategy capable of competing globally (to achieve quality FTAs) and which integrates the AfT Initiative and the EIF as part of its development trajectories for majority LDCs in the short-term.  

To achieve a mid to long-term ambitions requires the elaborate developing of strategies and tools to support the AU efforts to cooperate with the RECs (including member states) in strengthening institutions to ensure effective, legitimate and resilience that reconciles with the needs of African integration and AfT donor partners.

The outlook will be a more reliable economic bloc, equipped to; negotiate; have political clout; inspire business trade; implement policy; and engages a regional ‘policy driven bank’ for better integration and social cohesion. The RECs must therefore play a broader role to realign the AfT Initiative with strategic options, priorities and interventions as a prerequisite to achieving sound and stable project implementations.

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1. Press <Ctrl + Alt + Shift + S> to display the ‘Styles’ task pane

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[1]    https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm Accessed on 1/6/19 

[2]     https://au.int/agenda2063/overview

[3]    Financing consumption of a few people is not so bad, but the proponents of aid hoped for the kind society-wide transformation that would come from aid financing investment and growth  

[4]          https://www.theigc.org/blog/who-benefits-from-aid-for-trade/

[5]    Note that reverse causation, i.e., more intensive trade relations between the donor and the recipient driving the donor’s allocation of AfT, is unlikely for the altruistic group. Hence, the results for the group of altruistic donors suggest that endogeneity problems are not particularly serious. (See Hühne et al July 2013).

[6]    European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing April 2018: EU aid for trade: Taking stock and looking forward

[7] Permitting developed countries to create trading preferences for all developing countries and offering special treatment to all LDCs

[8]    General arrangement provides for a non-reciprocal duty reduction on about 66% of tariff lines. Most tariff lines that are subject to duty and are excluded from the GSP are products covered by the EU common agricultural policy ( See Members Research Service, EPRS, Briefing April 2018., p.5).

[9]    Provides a deeper tariff preference scheme to vulnerable countries if they can show that they have been effectively applying 27 international conventions on human and labour rights, and on environmental protection (Ibid).

[10]  The scheme grants duty-free access to the EU market to all LDC exports, except arms and ammunition, for unlimited period of time (Ibid).

[11]  https://www.trademarkea.com/onestopborderposts/about/  

[12]  https://www.eatradehub.org

[13]  Providing targeted investment facilitation, supporting adherence to intra-regional and international trade agreements and standards and removing barriers to regional trade in staple foods.

[14]  https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/05/chinas-2018-financial-commitments-to-africa-adjustment-and-recalibration/

[15]  https://www.heritage.org/event/webcast-only-the-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy

[16]  https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee/

[17]  https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/gr19_02nov18_e.htm

[18]https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/global_review15prog_e/global_review15prog_e.htm

[19]  https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/aid-trade-not-just-aid-trade/

[20]  https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/has-aid-for-trade-helped-african-economies-achieve-structural

[21]  Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution

[22]  https://www.brookings.edu/research/rethinking-africas-structural-transformation/ 2018

[23]“Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”

[24]  https://au.int/en/ti/biat/about 

[25]  Trade facilitation; Trade Policy; Productive capacities; Trade related Infrastructure, Trade Finance, Trade Information and Factor Market integration: see https://au.int/en/ti/biat/about 

[26]  The first phase (2008-2015) of the EIF programme provided almost US§204 Million in support to LDC beneficiary countries. The second phase of the programme (2016-2022) has soo far secured US79 Million (https://www.enhancedif.org/pt/funding/contributions

[27]  ‘Crossing Rivers, Feeling Stones: The Rise of Chinese Infrastructure Finance in Africa:https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/crossing-river

[28]  UNCTAD and COMESA partner on 3 million Euro project to speed up trade, 07 June 2019. https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=2110