International legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction – Negotiation Simulation Exercise at KU Leuven
The simulation exercise was an excellent opportunity to be in a situation to experience the re-enactment of international negotiations, it enabled me to have a subjective understanding of the complete negotiation process from preparation to conclusion (Kremenyuk, 2002 p. 466). I felt the very high degree of formality was necessary to act out the role as it brought out positive persuasive results. The same can be said of the style of communication and language adopted by most negotiators; which influenced the process; helped to convey arguments tactically; and changed the beliefs of the other parties to the negotiation through the promise of rewards (Holsti, K. J. 1995, p.124). I learned from this exercise that culture can also influence negotiations and that some negotiators appeared to act in a non-understandable way – to the extent that they did the opposite of what might seem to be in their own interest (Kremenyuk,2002 p.393).
I now recognize from the simulation experience that sometimes just agreeing to disagree is an important part of the discussion process as many of the issues were very complex and seemed impossible to overcome. As such leaving these issues aside appeared as the best way to manage the situation. I noticed that weaker parties were advantaged by being in coalitions as they were able to increase negotiating leverage and advance points of view that might otherwise be overshadowed (Guide for Negotiators Multilateral Environmental Agreements, p.4). The negotiation simulation was interesting for attending to the various personalities of the negotiators and to the way in which they exercised their techniques and skills, I felt this and the ambiance within which we operated as negotiators contributed to the simulation experience. I learned that research and preparation can be key and that information gathered strengthened the case of disadvantaged parties to the negotiation process (Kremenyuk,2002 p.105).
I held the view prior to the simulation exercise that the legal perspective would be a central feature of the negotiations and this seemed to be the case during the plenary sessions. This can be illustrated by the various interventions on the wording of the treaty texts. It was expected that due to the many participants in the negotiation, there would be a tendency to arrive at a compromise solution that did not necessarily advantage anyone, but be acceptable to most participants. I felt that in the latter stages of the negotiation this seemed to be the case. I expected that the simulation exercise would reflect the general nature of the dynamics and intricacies of current global politics; that is the dominant regions of the world setting the scene and tempo of the negotiations and the developing or more isolated countries yielding to tremendous pressure to concede on fundamental issues due to time pressure (Kremenyuk,2002 p.89).
In addition, it was an expectation that negotiators in the early part of the exercise would employ a psychological footprint (advantage) to be able to embed what they wanted to take out of the negotiation process (Kremenyuk,2002 p.258). I anticipated that the general purpose of the working groups sessions, would steer the diverging groups to a point of compromise and eventually to move towards the adoption of a compromised position. This was indeed the case albeit in a different approach and method. For example it happened in a very unconventional manner – revolving around smaller informal break-out groups and away from the presence and sight of the session facilitator (secret meetings).
The initial strategy approach of the ‘bigger countries’ to the negotiation process was a great surprise. In that, it was aimed at diminishing the goals of the smaller coalitions / smaller countries. I felt this was a very competitive approach and did not reflect the cooperative behavior needed to explore solutions that achieve an integrative, or win-win, solution (Yamin, Farhana and Joanna Depledge. 2004, p.12). As the negotiations concerned the common heritage of mankind, my expectation was that all parties would problem solve together to identify options that best satisfies their key goals especially on issues sensitive to national interests. The lack of time was a remarkable surprise in that key important decisions had to be made in order to move the negotiation process to its conclusion. An illustration was when the African Group had to decide whether to vote for or against the adoption of the treaty text despite its misgivings. I felt that, there was insufficient time for interaction and engagement in the plenary, this not only handicapped coalition preparations but also scuttled some strategies. At the same time it was a tremendous strategy success for other negotiators who gained momentum in advancing group / country interests. I was surprised by how well the simulation exercise presented a very accurate complete picture of a real – policy situation.
On reflection my views and impression on the working relationships within coalitions and the role of the working group facilitators changed. It was the role of the facilitators to pay attention to rapport and communication, as well as employing strong “people skills” to effectively guide negotiations. So for example in dealing with the Capacity Building – Transfer of Technology (CBTT) topic issues, it was dependent on the working relationship of the coalition negotiators to work towards a solution without interference from the facilitator. And, in turn for the facilitator to offer procedural assistance and links to outside expertise that facilitated an acceptable settlement as an option.
Representing a coalition coming to the negotiations from a weak position (African Group) was a positive challenge in that the negotiating coalition made certain gains employing powerful working relationships to its advantage. It was clear that during the working group debates that the other negotiating parties were not communicating (tactically not listening or participating). The negotiating coalition did well to continue to consult with them before making decisions on matters that affected them. Also the bigger coalition partner (G77 and China) were perhaps unreliable with information in their tactical choice to pre-negotiate and agree with the United States of America and European Union. To this, it felt that the coalition (African Group) needed to engage more because of its fundamental lack of leverage in the broader geopolitical and economic terms against the other parties (Yamin, Farhana and Joanna Depledge. 2004 p.9).
I engaged effectively in the working groups to ensure the adherence (CBTT) to the topic issue “red lines” from a country and coalition perspective. I raised an objection on a key fundamental point to ensure that the text proposal critical to the country / coalition strategy was not removed at plenary. During pre-negotiations, I devoted much time on good research for the topic issue and felt that this reflected as a strength during the working group discussions and on the final treaty text. I also felt that my participation in group discussions before the adoption of the treaty text was important as it allowed the coalition to self-assess the gains and losses.
On what went well and what would be improved, I feel this must be put into context with the overall flow of the treaty text plenary session; that is, the draft proposal treaty text for the CBTT topic, remained intact and so it was prudent to exercise patience, keep quiet and listen critically. However, for the broader coalition, I would in the future improve my capacity to intervene on the other topic issues that perhaps did not fare well during the treaty text negotiations. In addition, I need to improve how I approach the working group debates as on this occasion, I was very open to the options available and flexible about the demands. In retrospect I feel this may not be such a good idea, as I was confronted with a situation where the other negotiators were misleading about their preferences and were standing very firm on demands. In this situation it would have been important to strike a balance and employ both strategies in the same negotiation. It has been noted that this can create a dilemma as one needs to compete at the same time cooperate (Kremenyuk,2002 p.87).
Developing a working relationships could have been improved by the coalition employing an effective relationship building strategy (trust and honesty). In my view trust was not present between the parties; for example the African Group had the conviction that the other parties would take advantage of their goodwill to achieve competitive gain (Kremenyuk,2002 p. 95). The general impression was that the coalition negotiated away their position of strength. In the future the leadership approach could employ more persuasive power to build a winning coalition behind the treaty text negotiations.
The key coalitions the African Group and the G77 and China agreed on many of the pre-negotiation issues providing a platform for a conducive environment for negotiations. However the impediments to achieving the overall objectives of the negotiations were based on reliability and distrust issues (see above). Perhaps this arrangement was troublesome for the G77 and China; that is, a costly or risky venture to forfeit its working relationship with the United States of America and European Union. In this sense I focused on the coalition (African Group) that best served the interests of the country I represented, well away from the coalition dynamics that could weaken the country strategy position. The initial demands by coalition partners could have been echoed more loudly at the initial stages (Plenary), partly because sometimes parties tend to concede when there is stronger demonstration of need on the other side (Kremenyuk,2002 p.92).
Three similarities of the simulation exercise relate to the real-life climate negotiations; First, the negotiations on climate change had strong political leadership from the developed countries and this political will was a likely explanation why the climate talks were a success[1]. Second; The Paris Agreement constituted a political success in climate negotiations and traditional state diplomacy; demonstrated by the many secret informal meetings that were needed to break the deadlock. And finally the finance debate which was a redline issue for the G77 and China, resulted in several Northern rich countries which had initially opposed making financial commitments to change and accept the G77 demand for establishing a goal “from a floor of $100 billion dollars per year” by 2025 (Dimitrov, S. Radoslav, 2016 p.4)
The coalition and country representations were not culturally diverse thus making the experience more challenging to achieve the desired effects. In reality working to overcome pre-existing prejudices one may hold about certain regions can be possible however it becomes very difficult when one has to negotiate for that same region. The environment for the working group discussions were not conducive for the exercise and perhaps even disadvantaged some coalitions. Power – politics and psychological advantages played out; that is, some delegates sat on the floor whilst others stood looking down on them. Government delegations to global negotiations usually consist of more than one person (often very many more), with differing personal views and negotiating styles (Yamin, Farhana and Joanna Depledge. 2004, p.8). Negotiations on the environment usually concern issues that are technically complex and therefore require the participation of different types of technical experts. In the absence of these public opinion experts, it could be argued that the vacuum could create an isolated policy sector (Kremenyuk,2002 p.363). The absence of legal experts in the treaty text negotiations seemed unrealistic because these complex negotiations often hinge on semantics as well as determining the applicability of domestic law. A legal adviser to the delegation would know how to draft a text that is both agreeable and in keeping with all the relevant legal norms (Kremenyuk,2002 p.149).
It is a fair assessment that the heated and tense discussions coupled with high emotions and adrenaline reflected the actual negotiation dynamics. In addition, the intervention of one effective negotiator to problem solve and develop a consensus around the funding mechanism (for inclusions in the treaty text) was a very inventive way to create an option for progress towards a mutually acceptable agreement for all the parties (Kremenyuk,2002 p.105). We witnessed a number of trade-offs and compromises that were in line with the international environmental negotiations under the UNCLOS.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fisher R and Brown S, Getting Together: Building a Relationship that gets to Yes, Boston Massachusetts, 1998, p.38
Holsti, K. J. 1995. International Politics. A Framework for Analysis. 7th edition. Chapter 5. Foreign Policy Actions: Power, Capabilities, and Influence. London. Prentice-Hall p.124
Kremenyuk A Victor ‘International Negotiations’: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, 2002, pp.42-446
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed doors, Dimitrov, S. Radoslav, Global Environmental Politics, Volume 16 3, August 2016, pp.1-11
United National Environmental Programme Guide for Negotiators of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, pp.7-50
Yamin, Farhana and Joanna Depledge. 2004. Chapter 2. The International Climate Change Regime: The Organization of Global Negotiations pp.4-12 Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
[1] The 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 21
Regional Integration & International Trade 