The paper will argue that political institutions and geography are important ‘deep determinants’ that have led to certain development outcomes in Africa. A comparison of Botswana and Kenya will show that shared historical background is not a prerequisite to development. A clear reference to the origins of institutions will be made to better understand what is causing development and why some countries are susceptible to development trauma, in the absence of effective, legitimate, and resilient institutions and others are not.
A focus on institutions rather than geography[1] is necessary as geography has been described as having an exogenous nature in influencing economic performance (Rodrik et al. 2002, p.4), as well as being beyond the control of policy makers, whereas institutions have been identified as a key pre-condition of economic development (Bloch and Tang 2004, p.245).
Institutions were devised to create order and reduce uncertainty, in exchange for a structured; political, economic and social interaction in both informal constraints[2] and formal rules[3] (North, 1991, p.98). Protection of property rights, rule of law, efficient bureaucracy, corruption-free government and political constraint on the executive were identified as the basic institutional requirements necessary to impact development in developing countries (Easterly 2001, cited in Bloch and Tong, 2004 p.245).
Botswana and Kenya both gained independence from Great Britain, the former in 1963 and the latter in 1966. At independence both were relatively poor with a gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity (PPP) of $83.73[4] (World Bank, 2018) and $104.01[5] respectively (World Bank, 2018). In 1989 Botswana attained the middle-income level category, which now stands at $16,990[6] (World Bank, 2018), whereas Kenya attained lower-middle income status in 2014, currently standing at $3,250[7] (World Bank, 2018).
The difference in development, and roots of many economic and political institutions in continental Africa, can be traced back to the colonial period (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012, p.410), where extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions impeded and even blocked economic growth (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012, p.97). In this way the elite were enriched as they perpetuated their power at the expense of the vast majority of the people in society (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012, p.105). At independence from the colonial governments many of these institutions remained in place albeit with new leadership (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012, p.411), where the extractive economic institutions did not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and innovate and thus were supported by extractive political institutions to cement the power of those who benefit from the extraction (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012, p.413). This theoretical approach is useful to identify emerging governance structures that are weak, vulnerable and not conducive for growth.
Determining whether a country falls under the definition of fragility depends on the development discourse applied, as most definitions seem to suit a specific focus and objective. For example, Canada’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project (CIFP) emphasizes that the state needs to exhibit the three fundamental properties of authority, legitimacy, and capacity (ALC) to function properly. The World Bank Group (WBG) has evolved its understanding of the development challenges of fragile states to the now Harmonized list of Fragile Situations (2011-2019)[8]. Whereas the African Development Bank (AfDB) recognizes that the drivers of fragility can be categorized into four dimensions: economic, social, political and environmental, all usually involving exclusion and inequality[9].
In the 2018 Fragile States Index[10], Kenya ranked 17th and Botswana 120th , the former assessed as suffering from weak institutional capacities, poor governance, economic and social disruption, and insecurity[11] and the latter, third least fragile country in Africa behind Seychelles 125th and Mauritius 151st respectively.
However, fragility is also associated with various combinations of systemic dysfunction leading to government inefficiency and the breakdown of the social contract in particular on authority, service entitlements and legitimacy failures (Cammack et al, 2006, p.17). Cilliers concluded that in the African context, poverty, cyclical violence, economic exclusion and weak governance defined fragility when considering state capacity and performance to deliver security and development (Cilliers and Sisk, 2013, p.7). The levels of inequality and economic exclusion have been identified as distinguishing factors defining most fragile states (Carment and Samy, 2011, p.129).
According to Transparency International, Botswana scored 61/100[12] and ranked 34/180 countries in the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)[13]. In context this ranks them the least corrupt country in all the 54 countries in Africa, whereas Kenya ranked 143rd with a score of 28/100[14]. Corruption in Kenya has mainly been attributed to government officials and their impunity to evade responsibility for crimes committed, which in most cases take the form of land seizures, conflicts of interest in government procurement, favoritism, nepotism and rampant bribery in collusion with the private sector (United States Department of State, 2017)[15].
Without understanding the root causes of fragility, it is highly unlikely that any country can become prosperous and stable without first undergoing some form of institutional re-engineering. Kaplan noted two distinct root causes of fragility (a) a lack of social cohesion; and (b) a lack of a shared, productive set of institutions (Kaplan 2008, p.11). Botswana has shown signs of overcoming the negative trend – through its distribution objectives, in the provision of free basic and post – secondary education; zero – cost healthcare; and land plots for residence and farming purposes[16].
In addition, Botswana performs well on key components of a country’s overall governance performance: Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights and Human Development, where these categories contain subcategories that includes property rights, elections, poverty and legitimacy of the political process[17](The Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2017). These factors support the capacity of the Botswana state to create an effective governance system and a greater efficiency; in the use of resources for technological progress and innovation for economic growth and poverty reduction (Knack, 2002 cited in Bloch and Tang 2004, p.246).
According to the Heritage Foundation’s 2017 Index of Economic Freedom: an independent judiciary is crucial to enforcing contracts effectively and the protection of property rights, Botswana is globally ranked 35 with a score of 69.9 which is classified as ‘mostly free’[18]. The 2018 International Property Rights Index (IPRI) awarded Botswana a steady score of 5.9 with a global rank of 49 out of 125 and position 4 out of 27 countries in Africa[19]. Protection of private property is not only guaranteed in Section 8 of the Botswana’s constitution; but also there is no evidence to suggest that property rights and regulations are not being enforced and protected[20] (Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018).
Kaplan noted a special relationship between the state and legitimacy, which in dysfunctional situations and states divided along ethnic lines is absent. In these countries it is more difficult to generate a sense of social cohesion to ensure effective governance systems that promote development (Kaplan 2008, p.8). Whereas successful states utilize local identities, local capacities, and local institutions to promote growth[21].
Kenya’s 2017 and previous general elections provides an illustration of Kaplan’s theory: where perennial election process has always been marred by incidents and violence throughout, mostly precipitated by top political leaders on electoral and judicial authorities. This not only undermines the independence of the country’s democratic institutions and the rule of law but also the social cohesion needed to promote development. The 2017 elections therefore represented a major setback in Kenya’s democratic development and credentials[22].
Since its independence, two key factors have influenced the development trajectory of Botswana, first: the declining fertility rates (2.65 in 2017)[23], and secondly the rapid transfer and adoption of technology. The population growth rates have remained steady, currently growing by 1.8 percent annually[24], thereby presenting an opportunity to its lean population of two million[25] to share a larger slice of the growing GDP per capita and a fairly good quality of life (Kamrany and Gray 2013)[26]. In contrast, Kenya with a growing population of 50 million[27], is experiencing increasing fertility rates (3.9 in 2017)[28] with a significant growing young (aged between 15 and 35 years) constituent (35.4%) of the population[29]. Majority are affected by inequalities in access to education and the failure of the economy to provide sufficient jobs. Thus 38% of youth neither study nor work[30].
Kenya’s economy remains the most attractive business environment in Africa, only behind Morocco (60), Rwanda (29), and Mauritius (20) in the ease of doing business rankings (2019)[31]. Kenya made a big jump from 80 to 61 places. The performance is largely attributed to key reforms to improve the business climate for small – and medium-sized enterprises and the government’s outlined four big priority areas : food security, affordable housing, increased share of manufacturing, and universal health coverage to boost investment and job creation (World Bank Group, 2018)[32].
Botswana’s dependence on diamonds remains a major impediment to its growth, with key socioeconomic barriers continuing to pose a challenge on the rate of poverty (19.3% 2009)[33], and unemployment (17.36% 2017)[34]. Such that the slow diversification efforts will require special attention from all stakeholders to continue the economic transformation[35].
In conclusion, Botswana has shown remarkable growth rates in governance, economic and political transformation under inclusive institutions. The success of Botswana is mainly attributed to its historical strategic decisions to maintain and develop its nascent pluralistic institutions (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012, p.453). At independence, Botswana was able to quickly develop inclusive economic and political institutions ensuring that its vast diamond revenues could build state bureaucracy, political stability and education. In other countries in Africa including Kenya, where the British, came with the principle of divide and rule, magnified the ethnic differences that at independence were embedded to intensify extractive institutions that remain in place to date (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012, p.453).
Both Botswana and Kenya can learn from each other in areas that noticeable progress has been made, which can also act as a significant baseline for continental efforts. This can help in developing strategies and tools to support the African Union’s (AU) efforts to cooperate with member states in strengthening institutions across the continent, ensuring effective, legitimate and resilient institutions that bring forth economic and political progress.
REFERENCES
[1] Denotes resource endowment, history and culture in relation to the assessment of Botswana and Kenya
[2] Sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct
[3] Constitutions , laws, property rights
[4] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2017&locations=BW&start=1960&view=chart
[5] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KE
[6] http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/botswana Accessed in December 2018
[7] http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya Accessed in December 2018
[8] http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations
[9] https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-approves-a-new-strategy-to-address-fragility-and-build- resilience-in-africa-13316/ Accessed in December 2018
[10] http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2018/04/24/fragile-states-index-2018-annual-report/ Accessed in December 2018
[11] http://www.fundforpeace.org index ranks countries on vulnerability to collapse based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators using the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach.
[12] A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean)
[13] https://www.transparency.org/country/BWA Accessed in December 2018
[14] https://www.transparency.org/country/KEN Accessed in December 2018
[15] https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277255.pdf. Accessed in December 2018
[16] https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/botswana-economic growth_b_2069226.html?guccounter=1 Accessed in December 2018
[17] http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/ Accessed in December 2018
[18] https://www.heritage.org/index/country/botswana Accessed in December 2018
[19] https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/botswana Accessed in December 2018
[20] https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/BWA/ Accessed in December 2018
[21] In dysfunctional states these assets are undermined by the state institutional structures
[22] https://www.cartercenter.org/…/election_reports/kenya-2017-final-election-report.pdf
[23] 2.651 children per woman 72nd position out of 200 countries (www.worldpopulationreview)
[24] https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana Accessed in December 2018
[25] http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/botswana-population/ 2,352,637 Million 2018
[26] https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/botswana-economic-growth_b_2069226.html?guccounter=1 Accessed in December 2018
[27] http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kenya-population/ 51,540,151 Million 2018
[28] http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ Accessed in December 2018
[29] http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=KEN
[30] https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/KEN/
[31] http://www.worldbank.org/content/…/doingBusiness/…Reports/…/DB2019-report_web-version…
[32] http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/327691523276540220/Kenya-economic-update-policy-options-to-advance-the-Big-4-unleashing-Kenya-s-private-sector-to-drive-inclusive-growth-and-accelerate-poverty-reduction
[33] https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana?view=chart Accessed in December 2018
[34] https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Botswana/Unemployment_rate/ Accessed in December 2018
[35] https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/BWA/ Accessed in December 2018
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